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CURRENT LEGISLATION
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE '-FEDERAL AND STATE.-During
the halcyon days of American prosperity, a period when most Euro-
pean nations had definitely committed themselves to unemployment
insurance,2 we righteously derogated any reference to such a pro-
gram as un-American. True a number of resolutions and bills did
find their way into American legislatures, but they met the same
fate as all proposals in advance of their time-relegated to the limbo
of the committee room. 3 Even as late as 1928, the American Fed-
eration of Labor stigmatized the benefits derived from unemploy-
ment insurance as a dole and refused to have anything to do with it.4
It took the greatest cataclysm in American economic history to
bring this country to a realization that there was nothing inherently
1 It is of interest to observe that the term "unemployment insurance" is
not very precise. Obviously, it does not seek to insure against the risk of
unemployment. It seeks merely to pay compensation or benefits for a limited
period to one who has become unemployed. The Federal Act and the laws of
many states refer to this system as unemployment compensation. New York
retains the old term. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, Feb., 1935, p. 34.
'According to the report on unemployment insurance of the International
Labour Office, in 1925 the following nations had compulsory systems of
unemployment insurance: Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Irish
Free State, Italy, Poland, Russia (subsequently dropped it). Voluntary
systems of unemployment insurance existed in Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland. INTER-
NATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, Series C, No. 10(1925) ; Gilson, Unemploywnent Insurance, 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOCIAL ScI-
ENCES 162-165.
' In January, 1916, there was introduced in the Massachusetts House what
is considered the first legislative unemployment insurance bill in the United
States. In the same year Representative Meyer London introduced in the
United States House of Representatives a resolution for the appointment of a
commission to recommend a plan for unemployment insurance. Assemblyman
Orr introduced the first unemployment insurance bill in the New York State
legislature, but that met the same fate as the London Resolution. The first
state in the United States to ad6pt an unemployment insurance compensation
law was Wisconsin. It was passed in 1932 and is known as the Unemployment
Reserves and Compensation Act. Chapter 20, Laws of Wisconsin, Special
Session 1931; CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, Feb., 1935, at 35; Brandeis and Raushen-
bush, Wisconsin's Unemployment Reserves and Compensation Act (1932) 7
WIs. L. REv. 136.
"'Even the A. F. of L. did not formally come around to unemployment
insurance until the depression was upon us. When James H. Maurer, former
President of Pennsylvania Federation of Labor and I [Norman Thomas] tried
to make unemployment insurance an issue in the presidential campaign of 1928
we were usually told that we were trying to pauperize the people and establish
the dole." NORMAN THOMAS, HUMAN EXPLOITATION (1934) 207.
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foreign about unemployment compensation. 5 After endeavoring to
deal with the problem of unemployment by means of alphabetical
agencies-agencies which spelled out a system concededly worse than
the dole, our legislators turned to an investigation of the applicability
of unemployment insurance to American conditions.
It is our purpose to summarize and appraise the federal and
state enactments on that subject.
Te Federal Statute.
The Social Security Act 6 has four distinct sections: unemploy-
ment compensation, old age pensions, aid for needy children, and
health insurance. In this note we are concerned solely with those
provisions of the act which pertain to unemployment insurance.
The statute provides, in the main, for state systems of insurance
with federal aid. The states are left to enact their own laws, but
they are prohibited from participating in federal aid unless those
laws meet the requirements of the Federal Act.
In order to encourage and assist the states in the administration
of their unemployment compensation laws, the Act authorizes the
appropriation of $4,000,000 for the fiscal year ending 1936, and the
sum of $49,000,000 for each succeeding fiscal year.7 Each state's
allotment is to be based on its needs as determined by the Social
Security Board.8 However, in order to qualify for this subsidy, the
unemployment insurance law of the state must measure up to the
standards stipulated by the Act.9
The practice of insuring against unemployment owes its origin to the
trade union movement. England was the first country to introduce successfully
compulsory insurance against unemployment (NATIONAL INSURANCE LAW OF
1911). See SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, PAST AND PRESENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE (1930); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, UNEMPLOYmENT INSUR-
ANCE, Series C, No. 10 (1925) at 5.6 Act of Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, 49 STAT. -, 42 U. S. C. A. §301, etc.
IId. §301, 42 U. S. C. A. §501. These sums are not to be used by the
states for the payment of compensation, but merely for the expenses of admin-
istration. SEN. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 34.
8 Tit. III, §302, 42 U. S. C. A. §502. The Act provides for the establish-
ment of a Social Security Board to be composed of three members appointed
by the President with the consent of the Senate. Its chief duties are to
investigate the problem of social security, to assist states in the administration
of the unemployment insurance law, to certify payments to those states which
have complied with the federal standards, and the supervision of the payment
of annuities under the pension system. 42 U. S. C. A. §§901-904.
9 In order to qualify for this subsidy and the credit provisions of the
statute, the state laws must meet certain standards. The following are among
the most important:
a. Payment of unemployment compensation is to be made solely through
public employment offices in the state or such other agencies as the Security
Board may approve.
b. No compensation is to be payable with respect to any day of unemploy-
ment occurring within two years after the first day of the first period with
respect to which contributions are required.
c. Payment of all money received in the state fund is to be made imme-
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On or after January 1, 1936 every employer 10 shall be assessed
for each calendar year an excise tax .on his payroll of 1% for 1936,
2% for 1937, and 3% for 1938 and subsequent years." As a fur-
ther incentive to the passage of unemployment insurance laws in the
various states, employers in those states which have conformed to
the federal requirements may credit against the federal tax the
amount of their contributions to the state unemployment insurance
fund. However, the total credit is not to exceed 90%0 of the tax
against which it is credited.12
Provision is made for the establishment of an Unemployment
Trust Fund in the United States Treasury. Tl~e Secretary of Treas-
ury is directed to receive and hold in the fund all moneys deposited
therein by a state agency from a state unemployment fund. It is
the Secretary's duty to invest such portion of the fund as is not
required to meet current needs. Such investments are limited to in-
diately upon request to the Secretary of Treasury to be credited to the state
in the Unemployment Trust Fund.
d. All money requisitioned by the state from the Fund must be expended
solely for unemployment compensation.
e. No employee shall be disqualified from receiving compensation because
he refuses to accept a position made vacant as the result of a labor dispute;
or because the wages, hours, or conditions of work offered are substantially
less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the
locality; or because as a condition of employment he is required to join a
company union or resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor
organization. Tit. IX, §903, 42 U. S. C. A. §1103.
"In view of the novelty of the legislation, special attention must be paid
to the definitions. The term "employer" is defined to mean only those persons
who in each of at least twenty weeks in the year have a total number of eight
or more employees. The definition is so worded that an employer is covered
if one day a week for twenty weeks (need not be consecutive) there are eight
or more employees in his employ (Tit. IX, §907a, 42 U. S. C. A. §1107a). "Em-
ployment" means any service performed within the United States by an employee
ment" means any service performed within the United States by an employee
for his employer except agricultural labor, domestic service, service of a naval
nature, service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter,
or spouse, services performed by a child under twenty-one in the employ of
his father or mother, services performed in employ of the United States, a
state, or municipality, services performed in the employ of a corporation,
community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. (Tit. IX,
§907c. 42 U. S. C. A. §1107c.) "Compensation" is the cash benefits payable
to individuals. (Tit. IX, §907g, 42 U. S. C. A. 1107g.)
uld. tit. IX, §901, 49 STAT. -, 42 U. S. C. A. §1101.
"Id. tit. IX, §902, 49 STAT. -, 42 U. S. C. A. §1102. This provision is
explained as followys: If the excise tax is $100, the total credit which may be
claimed cannot be more than $90, although the total amount of contributions
may be greater than that. SEN. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) at
46. According to this provision employers in the states which have no job
insurance laws will be compelled to pay 3% of their payrolls into the Treasury
and this will be lost to them if the states fail to enact the necessary laws. The
money collected will be put in the United States Treasury to be disposed of
by Congress. The Act obviously aims at an equalization of interstate com-
merce to the extent that each state will tax the employer 3%.
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terest bearing obligations of the United States, or obligations guar-
anteed as to both principal and interest by the United States.13
There are numerous other provisions dealing with the admin-
istration of the Act, refunds, penalties, 14 and allowance for addi-
tional credit.15  According to the Act,1 6 "no person required under
a State law to make payments to an unemployment insurance fund
shall be relieved on the ground that he is engaged in interstate com-
merce, or that the State law does not distinguish between employees
engaged in interstate commerce and those engagd in intrastate com-
merce."
A number of states have already complied with the provisions
of the federal statute.17
The New York State Law.
Although the New York State Unemployment Insurance Law 18
was passed before the federal statute, it anticipated in almost every
detail the provisions of that Act.
In order to aid in the interpretation and application of the law,
the New York legislators begin with a clear and concise declaration
of the public policy of the state.' 9 The section devoted to defini-
Tit. IX, §904 a and b, 42 U. S. C. A. §1104 a and b. Although the
Fund may be invested as a single fund, the Secretary of Treasury is required
to maintain separate book accounts for the several states (§904 [e], 42 U. S.
C. A. §1104 [e]). In England payment of unemployment benefits is made
through the Labor Ministry, which controls a nation-wide system of employ-
ment exchanges. N. Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1935, 4:2, 3.
"Tit. IX, §905, 42 U. S. C. A. §1105.
15Id. Tit. IX, §§909-910, 42 U. S. C. A. §§1109-1110.l6Id. Tit. IX, §906, 42 U. S. C. A. §1106.
'? States which have complied: General Laws of Alabama, Regular Session,
1935, Act. No. -S. 395, approved Sept. 14, 1935; CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT
RFsERvEs LAW, Laws of 1935, c. 352, approved June 25, 1935; General Laws
of Massachusetts, 1935, c. 479, approved Aug. 13, 1935; UNEMPLOYMENT
RESERvES LAW, Utah, H. B. 86, approved March 25, 1935; Session Laws of
the State of Washington, Regular Session, 1935, c. 145, approved March 21,
1935; Laws of Wisconsin, Special Session, 1931-32, c. 20, as amended by cc.
186 and 383 of Laws of 1933, and cc. 192, 272, 446, Laws of 1935; DISTlucr
OF COLUMBIA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT, Public-No. 319, 74th
Cong., approved Aug. 28, 1935.
' N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 468. The New York law is the outgrowth of an
exhaustive examination of the effects of unemployment within the state made
by the joint legislative committee on unemployment appointed pursuant to a
resolution adopted April 9, 1931.
" Id. §500. "As a guide to the interpretation and application of this article,
the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: 'Economic insecurity
due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, welfare and morals of
the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of
general interest .and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature
to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. * * * Taking into
account the report of its own committee, together with facts tending to support
it which are matters of common knowledge, the legislature therefore declares
that in its considered judgment the public good and the well-being of the wage
earners of this state require the enactment of this measure for the compulsory
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tions is by necessity a lengthy one. "Employment" is stated to be
any contract of hire, including contracts entered into by helpers
of employees, whether paid by employer or employee, employed with
actual or constructive knowledge of employer.2 0  The types of em-
ployment not covered by the law are similar to those categories ex-
cluded by the federal statute.21  The term "employee" includes all
manual workers and non-manual workers who earn not more than
$50 a week or $2,500 a year.22  "Employers" are those who have
employed at least four persons in any employment within each of
thirteen or more calendar weeks in 1935 or subsequent years.23
"Wages" include salaries, commissions, bonuses, board, housing, lodg-
ing or similar advantages, and gratuities.2 4  "Benefit" is the money
allowance payable to an employee. "Payroll" means all the wages
received by employees.2 5  "Total unemployment" is the total lack of
employment and wages caused by the inability of an employee to ob-
tain any employment in his usual line of work or in any other field
for which he is reasonably fitted.26
On and after January 1, 1936 each employer subject to the law
is to contribute regularly 3% of the payroll of the employees. How-
ever, the contributions payable in 1936 shall be 1%o of the payroll
and in 1937 such amount shall equal 2%o. No contributions shall
be made prior to March 1, 1936.27  All contributions are to be de-
posited in the Unemployment Trust Fund of the United States
setting aside of financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed through
no fault of their own." The reason for this clear statement of policy can
be found in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, Amazon Petroleum Co. v. Ryan,
- U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 240 (1935). This decision held that, in an act which
delegates power to an administrative bureau, the legislative power must be
clearly defined as well as the facts and circumstances necessitating such delega-
tion of power; and that there must be an express finding, by the body to which
the power is delegated, of the existence of such specific facts and circumstances
for the validity of administrative or executive orders issued pursuant to the law.
N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 468, §502, subd. 1.
SSee supra note 10.
N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 418, §502, subd. 2.
'Id. §502, subd. 3. This provision differs from the federal statute. There-
fore, New York employers of four to seven employees inclusive are not liable
for the federal excise tax. This section specifies the conditions under which
an employer may be liable to the employees of a sub-contractor. An employer
not subject to the law may become fully subject thereto upon the filing with
the proper authority, his election to become subject to the law for not less
than two years.
Id. §502, subd. 6.
'Id. §502, subd. 7.
' Id. §502, subd. 10. The law covers seasonal and part-time employment.
The Commissioner in these cases is empowered to fix the conditions required
for the payment of benefits. The Commissioner alone can determine which
employments are seasonal. §§508 and 509.
'Id. §515, subds. 1 and 2 and §516. New York employers will be able to
deduct their state contributions from their federal taxes up to 90% of the
federal tax. Thus, when a New York employer is liable for $100 each to the
federal and state governments, he will pay $100 to the state and $10 to the
federal government.
1935 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
government .2  The law provides for the creation of an unemploy-
ment administration fund to consist of all federal moneys allotted to
the state and all moneys received by the industrial commissioner
for the administration of the law. 29 In case of default by an em-
ployer in his payments, the amount shall be collected by civil action
against him, 0 and the amount due shall be a lien against the em-
ployer's assets, subordinate to claims for unpaid wages and prior
recorded liens.31
It is important to note that no employee can make an agree-
ment to pay any portion of his employer's contribution. Nor may
an employer make a deduction for such purpose from the wages
or salary-of any employee a
2
Benefits become payable two years from the date on which con-
tributions by employers become payable. In order to become en-
titled to the benefits an employee must suffer total unemployment,
must have had not less than ninety days of unemployment within
the twelve-months period preceding the day on which benefits are to
commence, or in the alternative, not less than 130 days of employ-
ment during the twenty-four months preceding the day on which
benefits are to commence. 33 Benefits to employees shall be in the
ratio of one week of benefit for each fifteen days of employment
within the fifty-two weeks preceding the beginning of the payment
of benefits.34  However, the benefits are not to exceed a maximum
of sixteen weeks in any twelve-month period.3 5 Payment of bene-
fits are to begin January 1, 1938. The benefits are to amount to
50% of the employee's full time weekly wages, but are not to ex-
ceed a maximum of $15 per week, or to be less than a minimum of
$5 per week.3 6 No employee can waive his rights under this law, 37
nor can the benefits be assigned, pledged, encumbered, released, or
commuted.38 The benefits are also exempt from all claims of credi-
tors, and from levy, execution, and attachment. An employee who
'Id. §515, subd. 3.
Id. §520.
Id. §522, subd. 1.
Id. §523.
'Id. §517. This provision differentiates the New York law from the
European statutes. In most of the European countries the unemployment
insurance law is based on a tripartite contributory system: workers, employers,
and public authorities. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, Op. cit. supra note 2,
at 100; BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 37; Hewes, Britain's Care of the
Jobless (Dec. 1934) CURRENT HISTORY.
SId. 503, subds. 1, 2, 3.
"Id. 503 subd. 3 (e).
MId. §50.
'Id. §505, subd. 1. Section 504 specifies a waiting period of three weeks
before payment of benefits. Persons unemployed because of industrial disputes
or discharged for misconduct must wait ten weeks before becoming eligible.
aId. §512.
'Id. §513. Section 511, subdivision 3 modifies this provision to a slight
extent in order to permit approved claims by attorneys for services in connection
with the benefit to become a lien upon the benefit involved.
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refuses to accept an offer of employment is disqualified from receiv-
ing benefits unless his case falls within certain well-defined excep-
tions.3 9
The Act is to be administered by the Industrial Commissioner, 40
who is given the power to make the necessary rules and regulations.
The Commissioner is to create as many state employment offices as
he deems necessary.41 Claims for benefits are to be decided in the
first instance by the manager of the employment office where the
claim is filed. 42 Provision is made for an appeal to an appeal board
of three members 43 and for advisory council of nine members 44 to
be appointed by the Governor. The council is to advise the Indus-
trial Commission and investigate and study the operation of the law
with a view to making recommendations for more effective admin-
istration.
In conclusion, it should be observed that the state undertakes
the administration of the unemployment insurance fund, but dis-
claims any liability on its part beyond the amount of money received
through allotment from the federal agency. 45
Constituti-ality.
There is no question but that this federal-state system of unem-
ployment insurance will be attacked as unconstitutional on at least
two grounds, each of which requires our consideration.
I. The first basis of attack will probably be that the state law
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.46  It
will be contended that since the act requires certain classes of em-
ployers to make payments to a fund for the benefit of employees,
without regard to any wrongful act of the employer, he is deprived
of his property without due process of law.
The so-called "rights" of property under the due process clause
are not inviolate. In Barbier v. Conn olly,47 Mr. Justice Field stated
that the Fourteenth Amendment was "not designed to interfere with
the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power. to pre-
scribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the in-
"Id. §506. This section conforms with the provision of the federal act
which excuses a person for refusing to accept a position when there is an
industrial dispute in the establishment, when he would be required to join a
company union or would be compelled to give up his membership in a union,
or where wages, hours, and conditions offered are substantially less favorable
to the employees than those prevailing in the community.
' Id. §518, subd. 1.
"Id. §518, subd. 2.
"Id. §510.
"Id. §518, subd. 6.
"Id. §518, subd. 4. Three appointees are to represent employers; three
are to represent labor; and three are to be representatives of the public.
,Id. §529.
,U. S. CONST., Art. XIV, §1.
113 U. S. 27, 31, 5 Sup. Ct. 357 (1885).
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dustries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and
prosperity." It should be observed that the courts have long taken
cognizance of the fact that public necessity is the yardstick of the
police power of the state, provided the exercise of such power is
"reasonable." 48 If the legislation engendered by public necessity in-
terferes to a small extent with private property, the law will be
upheld. 49  However, if there is an invasion of certain fundamental
rights of individuals, such legislation can only be justified on the
ground of a corresponding benefit to the public.50 This "balance of
convenience" rule 51 which the Court propounds in cases relating to due
process and the police power is so vague in its implications that it is
far easier of statement than application.5 2
There are two important classes of legislation which fall within
this category and illustrate the principle involved, namely, that if it
can be shown that the enactment is a "reasonable" means of pro-
tecting the public health, safety, welfare, and morals of the com-
munity, the due process clause will not be a sufficient reason for
outlawing the legislation. In holding that the workmen's compensa-
tion laws were free from constitutional limitation and not violative
of due process, the Supreme Court took cognizance of the inevi-
tability of industrial accidents and approved the purpose of making
industry as a whole, rather than the public, bear the losses occasioned
by unemployment.5 3  In these cases the Court permitted the exercise
of the police power to place the cost of industrial injuries upon the
"Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911);
Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851); MorT, DuE PROCESS OF
LAW (1926).
"9Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499 (1894) ; FREUND, POLicE
POWER (1904) §63.
'In Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219,-243, 37 Sup. Ct.
260 (1916) the Court stated: "We are clearly of the opinion that a state, in
the exercise of its power to pass such legislation as reasonably is deemed to be
necessary to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of its people, may
regulate the carrying on of industrial. occupations that frequently and inevitably
produce personal injuries and disability, with consequent loss of earning Dower,
among the men and women employed, * * * and may require that these human
losses shall be charged against the industry either directly * * * or by publicly
administering the compensation and distributing the cost among the industries
affected by means of a reasonable system of occupation taxes."
In Leonard v. State, 100 Ohio State 456, 459, 127 N. E. 464, 465 (1919)
the court stated: "The dimensions of the government's police power are identi-
cal With the dimensions of the government's duty to protect and promote the
public welfare. The measure of the police power must square with the measure
of public necessity. The public need is the polestar for the enactment, inter-
pretation, and application of the law."
,UBrown, Due Process of Law. Police Power, and the Supreme Court(1927) 40 HRV. L. REv. 943; Cushman, Social and Economic Interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment (1922) 20 MIcH. L. REv. 737; Lambert, Une n-
ployment Insurance and Due Process (1932) 7 Wis. L. REv. 146.
0 Ibid.
'Hawkins v. Bleakly et al.. 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sun. Ct. 255 (1916) ; New
York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1916);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, supra note 50.
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employer, the one who derived the greatest benefit from the em-
ployee's labor.
The second class is exemplified by Noble State Bank v. Haskell5 4
wherein the Supreme Court sustained an Oklahoma statute which
levied upon every bank existing under the laws of the state an as-
sessment of a percentage of the bank's average deposits, for the pur-
pose of creating a guarantee fund to make good the losses of de-
positors in insolvent banks. In this connection Professor Paul H.
Douglas points out that
"such an assessment for the guarantee of bank deposits is far
more stringent in this direction than contributions for unem-
ployment insurance. For some at least of the unemployment
insurance contributions of a relatively stable firm will go to
pay benefits to its own employees while all of the contribu-
tions of banks which remain solvent will go to the depositors
of banks which become insolvent." r5
Furthermore, many states have laws protecting the sheep industry by
imposing a tax on dogs in order to create a fund for the remunera-
tion of sheep-owners for losses suffered by the depredations of the
dogs. This tax is imposed on all dog-owners, without regard to the
question whether their particular dogs are responsible for the loss of
the sheep. Statutes of this kind have been sustained by state courts
against attacks based on constitutional grounds. 6
From the tenor of these judicial decisions there is every reason
to believe that the state law will be declared constitutional. The case
for unemployment insurance is an impressive one and its proponents
will undoubtedly be able to establish to the satisfaction of the Court
that (a) unemployment is an inevitable risk of our industrial system,
(b) that it leads to ill-health, want and destitution, lowered morale,
reduced standard of living, decreased purchasing power, and con-
sequent business failures, (c) that the legislation is primarily designed
to distribute these risks more equitably, and (d) that the system will
aid the employer by stabilizing business in general. 57
"'219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911). In this case Justice Holmes
stated that: "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to
all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned
by usage, or held by the'prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion
to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare. Among matters
of that sort probably few would doubt that both usage and preponderant
opinion give their sanction to enforcing the primary conditions of successful
commerce. * * * If, then, the legislature of the state thinks that the public
welfare requires the measure under consideration, analogy and principle are in
favor of the power to enact it." (At p. 211.)
1DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOy MENT INSURANCE (1932) 195-196.
"Longyear v. Buck, 83 Mich. 236, 47 N. W. 234 (1890); Cole v. Hall,
Collector, 103 Ill. 30 (1882); Holst v. Roe, 39 Ohio State 340 (1883). See
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON UNEMPLOy MENT AND OTHER INTERSTATE
INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS (Albany, N. Y., Jan. 23-25, 1931) 94.
" For an unusually fine development of the case for unemployment insur-
1935 ]
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II. The second contention of the opponents is that the real
purpose of the Federal Act is not to raise revenue, but to establish a
nation-wide system of unemployment insurance. They claim that, if
the federal government may compel the states to adopt unemploy-
ment insurance under the guise of a tax, why may it not similarly
compel them to adopt any other type of legislation.58 Those who
maintain this view rely on the Child Labor Tax Case and the case of
Hill v. Wallace.59
In a number of cases the Supreme Court has consistently up-
held statutes which, while ostensibly revenue measures were obviously
intended to accomplish an entirely different purpose. 60 The Court has
frequently enunciated the doctrine that if a statute is a valid exer-
cise of the taxing power, the fact that such authority is invoked to
accomplish an object other than to raise revenue has no effect upon
ance, see DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra. note 55, c. I. See also LAMBERT, op. Cit.
supra note 51.
We are fully cognizant of the existence of authority which, if followed,
would be fatal to any compulsory system of unemployment insurance. Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1922) ; Lochner v. New
York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905) ; People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59
N. E. 716 (1901); Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431
(1911) ; to cite merely a few cases. We believe, however, that the economic
exigencies engendered by the problem of unemployment together with the
recognized necessity of adopting a permanent policy with respect to ameliorating
its effect on society, will impel the court to follow a plan which has gained
widespread recognition. In People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 412,
108 N. E. 639, 644 (1915) wherein the court reversed its earlier decision that
the legislative lirohibition of women's night work was a violation of due
process of law, Hiscock, J., stated: "There is no reason why we should be
reluctant to give effect to new and additional knowledge upon such a subject
as this, even if it did lead us to take a different view of such a vastly important
question as that of public health or disease than formerly prevailed. Particu-
larly do I feel that we should give serious consideration and great weight to
the fact that the present legislation is based upon and sustained by an investi-
gation by the legislature deliberately and carefully made through an agency of
its own creation, the present factory investigating commission." In this respect
see supra notes 18 and 19.
' Hearings Before the Finance Committee on S. 1130, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., Feb. 14, 1935, at 926-930.
'Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U. S. 20,
42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1921) ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453 (1921).
In these cases the basis of the Court's decision was that Congress had promul-
gated an exaction under the title of a tax but, in reality, a penalty.
'Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533 (1869) wherein the Court upheld a
10% tax on bank notes issued by the state banks, the real purpose of which
was not to raise revenue but to eliminate the state bank notes from circulation.
Cases wherein the taxing power was used in connection with social or economic
ends are Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 421 (1914);
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (1903) ; In re Kollock,
165 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444 (1897); United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S.
86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214 (1918).
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the constitutionality of the act.0 ' A concomitant motive will not in-
validate an otherwise valid exercise of the taxing power."2
The 90% credit device u3 was apparently mackt to parallel di-
rectly the machinery of the Federal Estate Tax Law provision in the
Revenue Act of 1926.4 The Estate Tax provided that the t. xpayer
should be credited with the amount of taxes paid to the state, such
credit not to exceed 80% of the tax. The constitutionality of that
provision was attacked on the ground that its purpose was to act as
an incentive to the states to enact inheritance tax legislation, and that
it especially discriminated against Florida, which was precluded by
its constitution from levying a tax of this kind. The Supreme Court
unanimously approved this device in Florida v. Mellon.c-
It should be observed that the Social Security Act is based on
the taxing and spending powers of Congress and not on the commerce
clause as in the case of the Railroad Retirement Act.60 The Act pro-
vides for a system of excise taxation, the proceeds of which are to be
paid into the treasury and to be used for administrative purposes. 67
Congress found it feasible to levy this assessment in the form of an
excise tax because the constitutional reference to this tax is contained
in very comprehensive language.0 s The only limitation upon the
power of Congress to levy excise taxes is geographical unity through-
out the United States. Subject to this limitation, Congress may
select the subjects of taxation and may exercise the power conferred
at its discretion. 69
' United States v. Doremus, supra note 60, at 93: "Although other motives
may impel the exercise of federal taxing power, the courts are not authorized
to inquire into that subject. If the legislation has some reasonable relation to
the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be
invalidated because of the suppressed motives which induced it." See also
CONG. REc., 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 79, No. 122, June 14, 1935, pp. 9670-2.
' In re Kollock, United States v. Doremus, both smpra note 60; Magnano
v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 Sup. Ct. 567 (1933). In the last mentioned case
the Court stated that the due process clause is "applicable to a taxing statute
only if the act is so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not
involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and
effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as for example,
the confiscation of property." (At p. 44.)
'See supra note 12.
REv. ACT OF 1926, c. 27, §301, 44 STAT. 9, 69-70.
=273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265 (1926). For an attempt to draw a distinc-
tion between the Social Security Act and the Estate Tax Act see Hearings
before the Ways and Means Committee on H. R. 4120, Feb. 7, 1935, at
982-983.
Act of June 27, 1934, c. 868, 48 STAT. 1283.
' The Railroad Retirement Act provided for the ear-marking of a special
fund out of which pensions were to be paid. Here we have a flat tax to secure
revenue and not to pay unemployment insurance or unemployment benefits.
The 10% tax is really for administrative purposes. Hearings before the
Fnance Committee on S. 1130, Jan. 22-Feb. 20, 1935, at 223.
U. S. CONST., Art. I, §8, cl. 1.
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, supra. note 60; License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 462(1866).
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A perusal of this federal-state legislation discloses a cognizance
of the constitutional limitations which it must satisfy. We have en-
deavored to show that there is ample constitutional authority in sup-
port of the enactments. What will, however, play an important factor
in any decision dealing with this question will be the necessity for an
economic measure of this type, and the inability of the states to act
alone because of the financial burden involved.70 Another important
factor which may influence the court is the necessity for the uniform
payroll tax in order to remove the unfair competitive advantage that
employers operating in states which have failed to adopt a compensa-
tion system will enjoy over employers in states which give such pro-
tection to their wage earners.71
Appraisal.
Like all legislation novel in character, the enactments have at-
tracted many an apologia and jeremiad. It is our purpose to sum-
marize the most important contentions of the critics.
(1) The traditional argument against unemployment insurance
is that it will lead to individual malingering. Now, it is of interest
to note that whenever these charges have been investigated, they have
been found to be irresponsible talk.72
(2) The opponents of the laws set forth the contention that
unemployment insurance should, at best, be a voluntary system. In
support of their argument they refer to the numerous experiments
in unemployment compensation conducted at various private firms
(Procter and Gamble, Dennison and Company, Columbia Conserve
Company, Fond du Lac Collective Plan, and the General Electric
Plan) .7
In 1932 about 200,000 workers were covered by voluntary plans
(individual company, trade union, and joint agreement plans). Since
the wage and salaried workers in occupations other than agriculture
totaled approximately 31,000,000, the voluntary systems resulted in a
coverage (in 1932) of about two-thirds of 1%. Mr. Douglas esti-
mates that at this rate of growth it would require 2,000 years to cover
the entire working population. 74  The reason for the slow growth
of voluntary systems is the added money cost-an item which com-
petitors do not experience. The resulting disadvantage in the corn-
Hearings before the Finance Committee on S. 1130, supra note 67, at
240-241.
Report of the President's Committee on Economic Security, Jan. 17, 1935.
BEVERiDGE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 40-42. See also excerpts from the
Report of the Unemployment Insurance Committee (1927), quoted in BEVER-
IDGE, p. 41. It is of interest to note that during seven years (1923-30) of the
operation of the English dole, 44% of the people that were insured did not
draw one penny of benefits. See Hearings, Subcommnittee, House Committee
on Ways and Means, March 21-30, 1934 (remarks by Abraham Epstein),
quoted in CONG. DIG., Feb., 1935, at 54 and 56.
'NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
HANDBOOK (1933) 189-192.
71 DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 55, at 33.
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petitive struggle acts as a decided deterrent. Most students of the
subject agree that progress can be made only through legislation. 75
(3) Opponents argue that workers ought to be required to con-
tribute to the unemployment fund. Their contention is based on the
fact that most European nations have been compelled to resort to a
tripartite contributory system in order to withstand strains on the
unemployment fund.
One group has attempted to answer this by claiming that, since
this is a piece of social legislation for the benefit of the workers, it
would be manifestly unjust to compel them to contribute. Another
group has set forth the proposition that, although the workers will
not contribute under the present laws, they will, in the long run, pay
most of the cost. A tax on payrolls is essentially a tax on the cost of
production, and it is eventually passed on to the consumer. Thus,
the cost of the system will not be borne solely by the employers; it
will have to be shared by labor and the consumers. 76 We shall un-
questionably hear more of this contention in the future.
(4) Critics of the New York State law object to a pooled un-
employment insurance fund from which all payments of benefits are
to be made. They advocate individual plant reserves, pointing out
that under the law the efficient concerns would be compelled to carry
a large part of the cost of unemployment resulting from the less
efficient ones.
The trouble with this argument is that it overlooks the very ob-
vious fact that in time of depression many firms would be compelled
to close down, and the reserves of the going concerns would not be
able to offer any protection to the unemployed of the closed or bank-
rupt firms.77
(5) A most sweeping criticism of the reserves features of the
unemployment insurance law is presented by Professor Elgin Grose-
close. He contends as follows: 78
"1. Financial reserves can be effective only in cases where
contingencies can be calculated and determined by actuarial
'INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COUNSELLORS, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1930) 221.
"N. Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1935, IV, 8:2 (editorial); Andrews, Two Acts
for the Security of the Wage Earner (Oct. 1935) N. Y. BAR ASS'N BULL. 190.
"Id. at 188-190.
Groseclose, The Chimera of Unemployment Reserves Under the American
Money System (Feb. 22, 1935) N. Y. TIMES ANNALIST 114. The basic prob-
lem encountered is that of obtaining pertinent statistics to supply the basis for
a sound insurance system. For a discussion of the actuarial difficulties see
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION' OF MANUFACTURERS, supra note 73, at 64-65; for a
discussion of the methods of treating these difficulties see DOUGLAS, op. cit.
supra note 55, at 128-136. For a comprehensive array of all conceivable argu-
ments against unemployment insurance, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANU-
FACTURERS, supra. It is of interest to note that as an alternative relief plan
the Association offers no definite substitute for this program. It merely advo-
cates a public relief fund, reduction in governmental expenditures, and removal
of legislative restrictions on industries (see c. XXIV).
1935 1
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
methods and where these contingencies arise in sufficient regu-
larity to permit the arrangement of reserves in accordance
therewith. 2. The incidence of depressions are irregular and
unpredictable, and hence defy actuarial procedure. 3. Pur-
chasing power cannot be stored up en masse under our money
system, which is a system of debt, rather than metallic circu-
lation. 4. The attempt to create unemployment reserves will
intensify booms. 5. Unemployment reserves are incapable of
mobilization when needed and any attempt to mobilize them
will only result in further intensification of depressions."
The import of these contentions is readily conceded, but are they not
more in the nature of a criticism of our economic structure than a
condemnation of the program itself? In time, a working solution
of these problems will unquestionably be evolved. However, grant-
ing the truth of those propositions, are there any other means by which
we can promulgate a system of unemployment compensation and, at
the same time, avoid the pitfalls of the reserves provision?
(6) An answer to this question has been suggested in one of
the most unusual documents presented by a Committee of Congress,
a document now frequently referred to as the Lundeen Bill.7 9 Dis-
satisfied with the conservative features of the current legislation, the
proponents of this bill present a formula of their own. The bill pro-
vides for a federal system of social insurance, including all workers
over eighteen years of age in all industries, occupations and profes-
sions. The bill covers all the employed for the entire period of un-
employment. The funds to pay for this sweeping system of social
insurance are to be derived from taxation on incomes of individuals,
on corporation incomes, on inheritances or estates, on tax-exempt
securities, and a tax on corporate surplus. s0 The social significance
of this plan is readily conceded. There is, however, a decided ques-
tion as to its feasibility from an economic and constitutional point
of view.81
So much for the critics. The supporters of the legislation, in
general, make no pretentious claims as to its ultimate effect. Their
position is that it will lessen the distress caused by unemployment,
and that it will furnish a partial means of stabilizing industry it-
self.82 The building up of unemployment reserves in normal times
'H. R. 2827, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 418 (1935). This is the
report of the House Committee of Labor.
' Ibid. To pay for this plan the Bill provides for the appropriation of
federal moneys out of the United States Treasury. The Bill is based on the
appropriating powers of Congress.
'The advocates of the Bill find constitutional justification for its provi-
sions in (a) the power of Congress to levy and collect taxes, pay debts, and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the people, (b) the
Sugar Bounty Case (United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 426, 41 L. ed. 215
[18961), wherein the sugar bounty was upheld in so far as to create a moral
obligation which Congress could meet by the approl)riation of money, and (c)
the general welfare cause.
' DOUGLAS, CONTROLLING DEPRESSIONS (1935) c. XIII.
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will provide protection for labor similar to that provided for capital
by the reserve policies of corporations. These reserves will prove
a reservoir of purchasing power, the use of which will tend to lessen
fluctuations in business by maintaining purchasing power in times of
stress.8 3 Lastly, the insurance will enable workers to claim a legal
right, to come forward as creditors, and no longer to be regarded
as applicants to charity. The system gives not only de jure rights
but de facto benefits.8 4
Conclusion.
In discussing unemployment insurance we are merely touching
the surface of the greatest problem confronting our generation-the
problem of social security. It is admitted by most students of the
subject that the only solution lies in a program of complete eco-
nomic rehabilitation.8 5 In the last analysis, unemployment insurance
is essentially a medicinal measure applicable only after the inception
of the malignant disease.8 6 Granted that is so, what is the importance
of the legislation discussed as to "certain hazards and vicissitudes of
life?"
Historically, the enactments are of importance because they aim
to promulgate for the first time in American history a system of
compulsory unemployment insurance. They aim to bring us abreast
of the social insurance legislation that most European nations have
deemed feasible for a generation or two. Practically, both laws are
minimal, the least that can be offered to wage earners.87 But we
must remember that this is merely a beginning, an experiment. The
near future will undoubtedly see the extension and liberalization of
many features of the plan. In the meantime, both laws require in-
telligent administration and whole-hearted cooperation.
ISmORE STARR.
THE VANISHING SEAL.-New York in 1935 took another
long step forward in doing away with the old-time force and effect
of a seal on a written instrument. Section 342 of the Civil Practice
Act was rewritten' so as to provide: (1) That a seal upon a written
instrument executed subsequent to the effective date of the Act shall
not be received as conclusive or presumptive evidence of considera-
tion; and (2) that a written instrument need not be under seal in
s DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 55, at 25-30; N. Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1935, 43:1.
' INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, op._cit. supra note 2, at 10.
' See works by Charles A. Beard, Paul H. Douglas, Stuart Chase, John
Strachey, Norman Thomas, and George Soule.
' For an elucidation of the argument that social insurance is a mere make-
shift, a temporary device, a mere sop to discontent, a program which begs the
entire issue of social security, see Mitchell, Social Insurance Is Not Enoutgh
(Feb. 1935) CURRENT HISTORY.
' Andrews, supra note 76.
'N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 708, effective Sept. 1, 1935.
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